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THE RIGHT(?) TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM* and ALISON ANN RAY"
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the door of the headquarters of the National Rifle Association (NRA) is
stated: "[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."' For
reasons of obvious self-interest, the NRA has chosen to omit the first part of the
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, which reads in full: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 2
Many Americans believe that every person has an absolute, individual right to
possess and use guns and other weapons. Polls taken in recent years indicate that a
majority believe that this "right" is guaranteed by the United States Constitutionspecifically the Second Amendment.3 Yet federal courts have repeatedly and
unanimously held that the United States Constitution does not guarantee to any
individual the right to own or carry a gun.4 Instead, the Second Amendment protects
only the right of the states to maintain organized military forces, guaranteeing
nothing to individuals.5 Thus, the Second Amendment is not an obstacle to
governmental control of gun ownership and use.
A.

The Individual "Right" to Gun Ownership
A number of reasons are offered by people who want to own and use guns. Many
believe that they need guns for security against crime, i.e., for defense of self and of
property.6 Many also want guns for hunting, target shooting, or collecting! Others
"just like to have a gun."'

* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. A.B., Harvard University 1950; J.D., John Marshall Law
School 1966.
** Judicial Clerk, Honorable Jos6 Marquez, Colorado Court of Appeals, 1996-1997. A.B., Indiana University
1993; J.D., John Marshall Law School 1996.
1. See Calvin Trillin, What the 2nd Amendmnent Does-and Doesn't-Say,Hous. CHRON., May 17, 1995,
at 2, available in WESTLAW, HSTCHRON database, 1995 WL 5904131, at *3-*4.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Right to BearArms Belongs to States, Judges Say, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 20,
1995, at A15, availablein WESTLAW, AZNP database, 1995 WL 2795067, at *3 (62% of those surveyed in a Los
ANGELES TIMEs poll); Don B. Kates, Jr., HandgunProhibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206-07 n.l 1 (1983) (87% in a 1978 national poll); Gordon Witkin et al., The Right to Bear
Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 1995, at 28, available in WESTLAW, USNWR database, 1995 WL
3113826, at *3 (75% in a U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. poll).
4. A number of these cases will be discussed infra Part .D.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See Donald L Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: ConstitutionalProtectionfor a Right of
Security, 9 HAMLNE L. REV. 69, 100 (1986).
The authors of this Article were fascinated to learn recently that the gun lobby even has its own patron saint-Saint
Gabriel Possenti, who was canonized in 1920. Legend has it that, in the 19th century Italian town of Isola, the young
Gabriel saved the town and its people from marauding brigands intent on pillage and rape. The story is that "Gabriel
suddenly seized two handguns from [the villains] and faced them down. To demonstrate [his] shooting powers ....
St.
Gabriel spied a lizard darting across the road at the critical moment of standoff. He drilled it dead with a single shot
and with that drove the marauders into retreat." Francis X. Clines, Lobbyist Finds Saintly Cause in Gun Control
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at A16, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, AUST Library, NYT File.
7. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 100.
8. It has even been suggested that "men doubtful of their own virility cling to the gun as a symbolic phallus
and unconsciously fear gun control as the equivalent of castration." Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political
Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 115 n.30 (1987).
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Much like a Rorschach test,9 people seem to find in the Second Amendment
whatever they already believe about the desirability and legality of gun control."0
Some, like the NRA," focus only on the second half of the Second Amendment and
insist that there is a broad right for every individual to possess and use arms. Others,
assuming that the first half of the Second Amendment was intended to have some
meaning, are equally certain that the sole purpose of the Second Amendment was to
protect against any federal attempt to disarm or abolish state militias. 2
Those who favor a broad, individual right to gun possession and use also argue
that the Second Amendment bars infringement not only by the federal government,
but also by the states.13 This position is based on the theory that the right to keep and
bear arms is a fundamental right, which was "incorporated" through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus applies to the states. 4 Opponents rebut this argument by
pointing out that the United States Supreme Court has never expressly "incorporated"
the Second Amendment, and that the "Court has rejected the notion that the entire
Bill of Rights [was] made automatically applicable to the states by the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment .. .""5 In fact, federal courts have held some important and valued
federal rights, such as the right to indictment by a grand jury16 and the right to a jury
trial in a civil case, 7 to be unincorporated rights and thus rights which the states need
not guarantee in their state courts.'"
Not only is there disagreement about what rights the Second Amendment protects,
generally, there also is uncertainty as to what types of weapons may be kept and
borne. For example, does the right apply only to the kind of weapons used by
militiamen in 1787, or does it also include the newer weapons which are used by
today's "militia"-including intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads?
And does the right to "bear" arms mean that only those weapons which can be carried
by a person are included, or are weapons which could be used by a militia included?
Regardless of the Second Amendment's applicability to the states, most states
have included in their own constitutions a right to bear arms, "and in some the right
is not linked to the militia."' 9 Included among the individual weapons rights which

9. The Rorschach test is a personality and intelligence test in which a subject interprets inkblot designs in
terms that reveal intellectual and emotional factors. See WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 1974

(Philip Babcock Gove, ed., 3d ed. 1976).
10. See Andrea Sachs, Why the Second Amendment is a Loser in Court,TIME, May 29, 1995, at 22, available
in LEXIS/NEXIS, NEWS Library, TIME File.
11. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
12. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 69-70.
13. See id. at 70.
14. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
15. Martin C. Ashman, Handgun Control by Local Government, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 97, 101 (1982) (citing
Adamson v California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
18. See, e.g., Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330, 337 (6th Cir. 1977); lacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 258
F. Supp. 880, 884 (W.D. Pa. 1966), affd, 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967).
19. Tony Mauro, Second Amendment Relevant or Just a Relic?, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, USATD database, 1993 WL 6730227, at *3.
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are protected by some state constitutions are: defense of self and others,' deterrence
of crime, 21 hunting and sport,22 and "for other lawful purpose."'
B. Regulation of Gun Ownership and Use
As early as 1915, an article in the HarvardLaw Review pointed out the need for
legislative regulation of gun ownership and use, in light of "[t]he greater deadliness
of small firearms easily carried upon the person, the alarming frequency of homicides
and felonious assaults with such arms, [and] the evolution of a distinct class of
criminals known as 'gunmen' from their ready use of such weapons for criminal
purposes .... ."24 More recently, in 1981, a Chicago suburb adopted an ordinance
banning the private possession of handguns within its boundaries 25 because: "'The
easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons have [sic]
increased the potentiality of firearm related deaths and injuries; and Handguns play
a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault and armed robbery,
and accidental injury and death.""
Gun control advocates point to studies indicating that it is much more likely that
a gun will be "used for domestic violence or suicide than to protect against
intruders," and that the danger of accidents increases greatly if there are children in
the household.27 Additionally, they point out that there is no "credible statistical
verification" for the pro-gun argument that "firearms... prevent murders, rapes, and
burglaries."s
As a result of the need for regulation of gun ownership and use, a variety of
infringements2 9 have been placed by federal, state, and local governments on the
possession and use of firearms. Among the more common restrictions are: (1)

20. See, e.g., UTAH CONsT. art. 1,§ 6.
21. This can be readily implied from the provision in many state constitutions that people have the right to
keep and bear arms for the "common defense" and "defense of the state." See, e.g., id.
22. See, e.g., NEv. CONST. art. I, § 11, cl. 1.
23. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. U. § 6.
24. Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARv. L. REv. 473, 473 (1915).
25. See Morton Grove, Ill. Code § 132.102 (1981), quoted in Ashman, supra note 15, at 97.
26. Preamble to Morton Grove, M. Code § 132.102 (1981), quoted in Ashman, supra note 15, at 97; cf
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637, 655 (1989) (citing statistics given by
Justice Lewis Powell in a speech to the American Bar Association).
27. See Gary Webel, The Myth of Guns as Protection, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 1995, at 24, available in
WESTLAW, USNP database, 1995 WL 6232444, at *2. According to an article in the HOUSTON CHRONICLE, a "gun
kept at home for protection is five times more likely to be used for an unintended killing or injury than for
protection[.]" Ron Greenberg, The Gun Question/ "Right" Just Doesn't Exist, Hous. CHRON., July 30, 1995, at 1,
available in WESTLAW, HSTNCHRON database, 1995 WL 9396562, at *5.
28. Mark Udulutch, The Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic Gun Control
Proposals, 17 Am. J. CiM. L 19, 22 & nn.17 & 18 (1989).
29. The word "infringe" means to defeat, frustrate, violate, destroy, encroach, or hinder. This definition can
be found in dictionaries over the last 240 years. See, e.g., WEBsTE's THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTONARY, supra
note 9, at 1161; Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36
OKLA. L. REv. 65, 99 & n. 169 (1983).
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registration,3" licensing,31 and waiting period32 requirements; (2) prohibition for certain types of people (e.g., minors, the blind, persons non compos mentis, felons,
fugitives, and drug addicts); 33 (3) prohibition of types of weapons (e.g., brass
knuckles, sling shots, certain knives, automatic weapons, and concealed weapons);'
and (4) prohibition for certain places (e.g., courts of justice, polling places, schools,
religious and political meetings, places of worship, legislative halls, street parades,
35
public demonstrations, casinos, bars, theaters, banks, and playgrounds). These
different types of regulations are discussed infra Part III.B.2.
II.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT: HISTORICAL BASIS AND UNITED
STATES CASE LAW

American rights, privileges, and duties 36 with regard to keeping and bearing arms
are derived from the United States' common law heritage which was inherited and
37
adopted by the American colonies, the states, and the United States. It can be
argued that some English and American citizens have had a duty to keep and bear
arms at various times in history. So, too, it has generally been recognized that most,
if not all, citizens have a privilege to keep and bear arms, subject to the power of the
state3 1 to limit or deny the privilege whenever the state deems it appropriate. But
those who assert that there has been, now is, and always will be a right of citizens to
keep and bear arms, in the sense of an immunity to the will of the majority, except
in the case of an extraordinary countervailing public need, are historically on very
shaky ground.
A.

England
During much of the history of England, keeping and bearing arms was looked
upon above all as a duty.39 For many centuries, England had no standing army and

30. Registration requires only that gunowners identify themselves and their weapons to a designated authority.
See Kates, supra note 3, at 265.
31. Licensing may be either restrictive-where the grant of a license is discretionary-or permissive-where
applicants are entitled to obtain licenses unless they fall into expressly prohibited categories such as minors,
incompetents, or felons. See id. at 264-65; see also discussion infra Part Ill.B.2.a.
32. See Michael D. Ridberg, Note, The Impact of State ConstitutionalRight to Bear Arms Provisionson State
Gun Control Legislation,38 U. CHI. L. REV. 185, 210 (1970).
33. See Emery, supra note 24, at 476; see also M. Truman Hunt, The IndividualRight to Bear Arms: An
Illusory Public Pacifier?, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 751, 765 n.73; Kates, supra note 3, at 210.
34. See Emery, supra note 24, at 476; see also Hunt, supranote 33, at 761; Kates, supra note 3, at 210.
35. See Emery, supra note 24, at 476-77; see also Hunt, supra note 33, at 762.
36. It is helpful to have in mind the meaning of the words "duty", "right", and "privilege". Too often these
words are tossed about rather carelessly without any real understanding of their "true" meaning. A "duty" is usually
defined as an obligatory task, conduct, service, or function. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 573 (3d ed.
1993); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 505 (6th ed. 1990). A "right" is usually defined as something to which one has
ajust claim; or, a power of free action. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra, at 1553; BLACK's LAw
DICnONARY, supra, at 1323-24. A "privilege" is usually defined as a benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, group,
or class. See e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra, at 1442; BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra, at 1197.
37. See Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to Keep and BearArms, 10 N. KY.
L. REv. 63, 64 & n.3 (1982).
38. "State" in this instance refers generally to a "sovereign," not to one of the 50 states of the union.
39. See Gardiner, supra note 37, at 67.
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no regular police force.' Armed and responsive citizens were essential to preserving
order.41 All able-bodied men were subject to service to pursue wrongdoers,
to put
42
down breaches of the peace, or to resist invasions or insurrections.
The "militia" in England has been traced back to at least 690 A.D., and the
obligation of Englishmen for such service may well be older than that.4 3 Long before
the Norman Conquest, the political and military system of England imposed a legal
obligation to "keep and bear arms. ' 44 Because there was no police or standing army, 45
every Englishman was expected to be ready at any time to respond to the "hue and
cry" and pursue wrongdoers, or to form an emergency army to repel invasion.46
Landowners were required to have available and ready certain arms, equipment, and
men-at-arms for military service when needed. 47 A man's obligation depended upon
his rank, status, and estate. 48 Thus, early English "militias" were not so much allowed
to have arms, but rather requiredto have them.49
I The English tradition of possession of arms by individuals for militia use
continued in the centuries after the Battle of Hastings in 1066. In 1181, a decree of
King Henry II, the Assize of Arms, restated the obligations of "every freeman [to]
keep arms suited to his station in life, in order to aid in the defense of the kingdom."50
In 1253, in another Assize of Arms, the duty to keep arms was extended to apply not
only to freemen, but also to serfs, who were required to have a dagger and a lancelike weapon called a halberd. 5 ' These earlier assizes were reaffirmed in 1285 in the
Statute of Winchester by King Edward I, who also added a requirement that bows
and arrows should be kept by those who could afford them. 2
These early decrees illustrate that the keeping and bearing of arms was subject to
governmental limitation and restriction at any time.53 As the Third Circuit stated in
United States v. Tot,-4 bearing weapons "was never treated as anything like an
absolute right by the common law,, 55 and "was regulated by statute.., as far back
as the Statute of Northampton in 1328 ... "56 Indeed, King James I repealed the
Statute of Winchester in 1603, thereby eliminating that statute's requirement to

40. See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right ofthe People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition,

10 HAST. CON. L.Q. 285, 290 (1983).
41. See id.; see also Gardiner,supra note 37, at 67-68.
42. See Malcolm, supra note 40, at 290-92.
43. See David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudenceof the Second Amendment,
9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 562 (1986).

44. See id.
45. See Kates, supranote 3, at 214.
46. See id. at 215.
47. See Emery, supranote 24, at 474.
48. See id.
49. See Kates, supranote 3, at 214.
50. Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You
Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 8 (1989).
51. See Hardy, supra note 43, at 564.
52. See id.
53. See Emery, supranote 24, at 473-74.
54. 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942).
55. Id. at 266.
56. Id.
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of arms and provisions
possess arms, and at the same time requiring that 5"magazines
t7
should be collected in one place in each county.
For the fifty years from 1639 to 1689, England was engaged either in civil war or
a continuing struggle for power between the Crown and Parliament. 8 Whichever
entity had power at the time attempted to disarm its opponents.5 9 For example, the
Militia Act of 166260 empowered British officials to "seize all arms in the ...possession of any... persons... judge[d to be] dangerous to the peace of the kingdom."' 6' The Game Act of 1670 62 provided "that no one could keep guns who was
lower in rank than the son or heir of an esquire, unless he possessed lands that earned
at least one hundred pounds per year. '63 These statutes, along with the restrictions
keep
enacted in prior centuries discussed above, further demonstrate "that a right to 64
and bear arms was not regarded as a fundamental right of every Englishman."
there were substantial efforts to
Finally, during the brief reign of King James IU,
disarm all Protestants, while Catholics were allowed to keep and bear arms.6s This
disarmament was a primary reason for the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the
ascendance to the throne of William and Mary, and the English Bill of Rights of
1689.66 The English Bill of Rights provides in part:
Whereas the late King James II did endeavor to subvert and extirpate the
Protestant religion ... by causing several good subjects being Protestants to be
disarmed at the same time when papists were... armed .... [we] declare... that

the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to
their conditions and as allowed by law.67
Two things can be derived from the above quotation. First, there was no intent or
attempt on the part of the English government through the English Bill of Rights to
create a broad individual right to keep and bear arms. The objective was to give
Protestants parity with Catholics as to the possession of arms. Second, because the
English Bill of Rights provided expressly that Protestants could have arms only "as
allowed by law," possession of guns remained regulable by the government.
If there is any doubt as to the power of the British government to regulate arms,
it must be noted that "the English have not hesitated since 1689 to pass heavily
restrictive gun control laws, 6' and have indeed "gone far beyond the Americans in
"....
69 In view of the long history of regulation in
limiting access to firearms

57. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 8.
58. See Hardy, supra note 43, at 571.
59. See generally id. at 572-73.
60. 14 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1662), cited in Lund, supra note 8, at 111 n.22.
61. Id.
62. 22 Car. 2, ch. 25, § 3 (1670), cited in Udulutch, supra note 28, at 25-26.
63. Id.
64. Emery, supra note 24, at 474.
65. See David . Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
31, 33 (1976).
66. See id.
67. ENGLISH BILLOF RIOHTS, I W. & M. 2, ch. 2 (1689), cited in Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 12.
68. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 9.
69. Id.
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England, there is no basis for the claim that an American's individual "right" to keep
and bear arms is derived from the English common law.
B.

The American Colonies
From the earliest days of colonization in the New World, virtually every household
had one or more guns.7' The early English colonists commonly lived in small isolated
communities and needed weapons to defend themselves, their families, and their
communities from the Indians, the French, the Spanish, and the Dutch. 7 The
colonists also were dependent on hunting for meat. 72 The possession and use of guns
was not only largely unrestricted, 73 but was often mandated by the colonial
legislatures to increase public safety and to provide for the common defense. 74 Even
as towns, and then cities, grew from the colonies, a frontier mentality pervaded the
attitudes of most
people, particularly as to the need and desirability of the possession
7
of weapons. 1
Until King George III sent British troops to America in the 1760s, there never had
been a standing army of professional troops in the American colonies.76 Prior to the
sending of British troops, each American colony had a militia that was modeled on
the British system.77 Generally, all men over eighteen were subject to service and
were required to provide their own arms and equipment. 78 The colonies had neither
the financial resources nor available manpower to support a standing army,79 and
because an armed and prepared citizenry was always on call, there was no need for
a standing army.8°
In the ten years from the Stamp Act in 1765 to the outbreak of war in 1775, the
British not only had full-time professional troops in America, but also made
continuing attempts to disarm the colonists.8 This culminated in British attempts in
1775 to seize stores of weapons and ammunition in Williamsburg, Virginia, in
Salem, Massachusetts, and finally in Concord, Massachusetts, precipitating first the
battles of Lexington and Concord, and then the Revolutionary War. 82
C. ConstitutionalConvention, Ratification,and the Bill of Rights
The United States Constitution represents "a compromise between the centralizing
federalism of [Alexander] Hamilton" and "the less doctrinaire centralism of [James]

70. See Hardy, supra note 43, at 587-88.
71. Seeid. at587.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id. at 587-88.
See id.
See Lund, supra note 8, at 117.
See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 14.
See id.
at 14 n.65.
See Emery, supra note 24, at 475.
See Kates, supra note 3, at 214.
See id. at 214-15.
See Hardy, supra note 43, at 590.
See id. at 590-92.
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Madison, ' 3 the latter representing the majority position in the new nation. ' Madison
was well aware of the need for a stronger national government than that provided for
by the Articles of Confederation.85 It was generally agreed that an effective national
defense required a standing army. 6 However, Madison also recognized that creating
a federal standing army unchecked by state militias would threaten the integrity of
7
the states and might deter ratification of the Constitution. In addition, most people,
especially the new nation's leaders, continued to look upon citizen militias as a vital
88
and integral defense against foreign invasion and domestic uprisings. (Indeed, it
was a citizen militia that had defeated professional British troops and won American
independence.) 9 In addition, a citizen militia was deemed to be a far lesser threat to
civil liberties than a standing army. 9' As a result, the new federal government was
given authority to raise and support an army, subject both to civilian control and to
9
a two year limitation on appropriation of money for the support of the army.
During the debates over ratification of the Constitution it became clear that there
was justifiable concern over the lack of express protection in the Constitution for
certain rights. 2 The Revolution was caused by British denial and infringement of
93
rights which the colonists felt were inherent in a free society. Proponents of
ratification accepted the need for prompt adoption of a Bill of Rights.' Indeed, such
95
action was promised in some states as an incentive for ratification.
Prior to the proposal by Congress of the constitutional amendments constituting
the Bill of Rights, there were several proposed amendments which would have
prohibited the federal government from interfering with the bearing of arms by
individual citizens.9 None of these proposals were adopted.'
As Professor Laurence Tribe has stated:

83. Ronald B. Levine & David B. Saxe, The Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms, 7 Hous. L. REV.
1, 2 (1969).
84. See id.
85. See Levine & Saxe, supra note 83, at 3.
86. See Gardiner, supra note 37, at 74.
87. See id.
88. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 91.

They tell us that we are weak--unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall
we be stronger? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British guard shall be
stationed in every house? Three million people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, are invincible
by any force which our enemy can send against us.
James R. Peterson, Once and ForAll: What the Founding FathersSaid About Guns, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1995, at

46, available in WESTLAW, MAGAZINE database, at *3 (quoting Patrick Henry in 1775).
Militias, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves and include all men capable of
bearing arms. To preserve liberty it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess
arms and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them.
Id. (quoting RICHARD HENRY LEE, AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE
REPUBLICAN 170 (1788)).
89. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 91.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 25.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 25-26.
See id. at 27.
See id. at 26-27.
See id. at 27.

Summer 1997]

THE RIGHT (?) TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

[T]he sole concern of the [Slecond [A]mendment's framers was to prevent such
federal interferences with the state militia as would permit the establishment of
a standing national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy. Thus
the inapplicability of the [S]econd [A]mendment to purely private conduct, to
state action, and to congressional firearms controls not shown to interfere with
the preservation of state militia, comports with the narrowly limited aim of the
[Second A]mendment as merely ancillary to other constitutional guarantees of
state sovereignty.98
The sole purpose of the Second Amendment was to assure that there would be
effective state militias.' This purpose was accomplished by guaranteeing possession
of arms by the individuals who made up the militia.'0°
There is no evidence that the Second Amendment was intended to confer a right
to "keep and bear arms" for any other lawful purpose."0 ! The Constitutional
Convention records do not indicate that there was any discussion of a positive,
individual right to bear arms, or that there was any fear of oppression by state
governments. " In fact, the states were looked to for protection of individual liberties
and for protection from oppression by the new national government." 3 Further
evidence of the Framers' non-intent to create a positive, individual right to bear arms,
is the fact that the Framers chose the word "bear" in wording the Second
Amendment. When a person or unorganized group carries weapons, we do not speak
or think of that as "bearing arms." This was as true 200 years ago as it is today."0 t
Rather, the use of the word "bear" suggests carrying arms for a military purpose."
Most of the rights protected in the Bill of Rights have continued validity today."' 6
Others, such as the quartering of troops in private homes" 7 and the right of states to
maintain and arm a militia lt 8 have not been a real problem in the past 200 years. Both
the Second and Third Amendments were responses to concerns at that time, and are
anachronisms today."19
D.

JudicialInterpretation
The United States Supreme Court stated in 1875, in United States v.
Cruikshank," ° that an individual right to bear arms for a lawful purpose is not
granted by the Constitution, and the existence of such a right is not in any way
dependent on the Constitution for its existence."' The Cruikshank Court also stated
98. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTrIONAL LAw 226 n.6 (1978) (citations omitted).

99. See Kates, supranote 3, at 217.
100. See id.

101. See id.
102. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 24.
103. See id.
104. See Emery, supra note 24, at 476.
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of speech and press); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to jury trial);
U.S. CONST. amend. V (freedom from self-incrimination).
107. See U.S. CoNST. amend. 111.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
109. See Kates, supra note 3, at 212.
110. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
111.

See id.
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that the Second Amendment restricts only action by the federal government, and has
no effect on action by state governments or private individuals."' Even as a
restriction on the power of the federal government, the court in United States v.
Adams 1 3 pointed out:
The [S]econd [A]mendment to the Constitution... has no application to [the
National Firearms Act]. The Constitution does not grant the privilege to
racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of the character dealt with in the
act. It refers to the militia, a protective force of government; to the collective
body and not individual rights." 4
From Cruikshank in 1875 to United States v. Miller"5 in 1939, only once has a
court specifically ruled".6 that the Second Amendment applies as a restraint on the
power of the states." 7 While state and local gun control regulations have been
challenged successfully in some recent cases, the challenges have been based on state
constitutional provisions, not on the Second Amendment." 8
The United States Supreme Court issued its most direct and broad consideration
of the Second Amendment in 1939 in United States v. Miller."9 In Miller, the
defendants were charged with unlawfully transporting a firearm in interstate
commerce without having registered the firearm, and with not having a stamp-affixed
written order for the firearm in their possession, as required by the National Firearms
Act. 120 The federal district court held that the above portion of the act violated the
Second Amendment, and therefore sustained a demurrer and quashed the
indictment.' The United States took a direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 22
The Supreme Court observed that a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length"' 2 3 was not part of ordinary military equipment, nor could its use
contribute to the common defense. 24 There was no "evidence tending to show that
possession or use of [such a weapon had any] reasonable relationship to the

112. See id.; see also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (The restrictions of the Second Amendment
"operate only upon the federal power.").
113. 11F. Supp. 216(S.D. Fla. 1935).
114. Id. at 218-19 (discussing the National Frearms Act, Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757 § 11, 48 Stat. 1236
(1934) (then codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 861a-861q (1934) (currently codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1132c-I 132q (1934)).
115. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
116. See In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902).
117. See Velazquez v. United States, 319 U.S. 770 (1943) (Second Amendment does not apply to the states);
Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270
(7th Cir. 1982) (same); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942) (same).
118. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744, 751 (Colo. 1972) (local ordinance barring possession
of a deadly weapon is unconstitutionally overbroad under the Colorado Constitution); City of Princeton v. Buckner,
377 S.E.2d 139, 141 (W. Va. 1988) (A state statute requiring license to carry firearms violated the state constitutional
provision that "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for
lawful hunting and recreational use." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22.).
119. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
120. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, § 11, 48 Stat. 1236, 1239 (1934) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1132c-1 132q
(1934)).
121. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 176-77.
122. See id. at 177.
123. Id. at 178.
124. See id.
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preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia. . ." Therefore, the Miller
Court concluded that the Second Amendment did not guarantee the individual right
to keep and bear such a weapon.'" The Court pointed out that the "obvious purpose"
of the Second Amendment was "to assure the continuation and... effectiveness of'
state militias and to protect them from suppression by the national government and
its standing army.127 The Court also recognized that the term "militia" had a clear
meaning, which was evident in "the debate, in the [Constitutional] Convention, the
history and legislation of [the] Colonies and States, and the writings of approved
commentators .'12' A "militia" was constituted of all physically capable males, who
were expected to bring their own arms when called for service.' 29
The Miller Court reviewed the history of the militia system in England and the
American colonies," ° as has been done in this Article at Part II.A and Part II.B. The
Court pointed out that keeping and bearing arms was really an obligation; every
citizen subject to militia service "shall equip himself' or "shall... provide himself'
with an appropriate firearm, and failure to do so could result in a fine. 3 ' The Miller
Court thus clarified three things regarding the protection afforded by the Second
Amendment: (1) keeping and bearing arms is a protected right only in relation to the
needs of a militia 32 ; (2) the weapons involved must be such as could be used for
militia service133 ; and (3) the right to keep and bear arms
is a collective right for the
34
benefit of the people-it is not an individual right.'
Miller, and the cases since Miller, make it clear that only a federal attempt to
disarm organized state militias could possibly constitute a violation of the Second
Amendment. Such a federal attempt is not only highly unlikely, but is in no way
allowed by any of the firearms regulations that have been proposed, discussed, and
sometimes adopted by federal, state, and/or local governments.
Without exception, courts have rejected all claims to an individual right based on
the Second Amendment.' Not infrequently, courts have disposed of these claims

125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 179.
129. See id. at 180.
130. See id. at 178-82.
131. See id. at 180.
132. See id. at 177.
133. See id. at 178.
134. See id.
135. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (Given the history of England and the
American colonies, it cannot be concluded that the Second Amendment protects individual possession of military
weapons.); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1975) ("It is clear that the Second Amendment
guarantees a collective rather than an individual right."); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974)
(The Second Amendment confers only a collective right to keep and bear arms.); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d
144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (The Second Amendment "applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not
to [an] individual's right to bear arms ....); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543
F. Supp. 198, 210 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("[Ihe Second Amendment does not imply any general constitutional right for
individuals to bear arms ....); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D.N.H. 1981) ("[Tihe Second
Amendment is a collective right to bear arms rather than an individual right, and has application only to the right of
the state to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms."); Utah v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah
1982) ("[IThe right to bear arms under the federal Constitution is... collective rather than individual.").
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perfunctorily in one paragraph or less. 3 6 The modem federal cases have held that
"[ilt is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an
individual right";'" that a gun control law which does not impair the maintenance of
a state's active, organized militia does not violate the Second Amendment; 38 that the
Second Amendment only prevents the federal government from prohibiting the use
or possession of a weapon "which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well-regulated militia";' 39 and that the Second Amendment limits
only federal action, not action by a state or local government.'" As the Third Circuit
stated in 1942:
It is abundantly clear both from the discussions of [the Second A]mendment
contemporaneous with its proposal and adoption and those of learned writers
since that this amendment, unlike those providing for protection of free speech
and freedom of religion, was not adopted with individual rights in mind, but as
a protection for the States in the maintenance of their
4 militia organizations
against possible encroachments by the federal power.' 1
The Supreme Court has shown no interest in modifying or overturning these narrow
readings of Miller or in disturbing almost sixty years of settled law.
E.

Conclusion
The Second Amendment protects the right of the people to keep and bear arms
only to the extent necessary to fulfill their obligations as members of the militia. For
many years the federal government has armed and equipped the National Guard,
which is the militia of modern times. Citizens are not required to furnish their own
weapons for service in this militia. Thus, under present-day circumstances, it is
unlikely there is any restriction on or limits to federal regulation of individual
ownership and possession of weapons. 42
The United States arose out of colonies and states with a decidedly frontier
atmosphere and mentality. It was created by a revolution, and its early leaders
believed in a right of revolution against oppressive rulers. The purpose of the Second43
Amendment was to protect against oppression by the new national government.
But two centuries of American history clearly show that there is no rational basis for
the individual possession of arms for use in a militia which will deter federal
oppression. Any federal oppression of either the states or individuals is not imposed
by armed might, nor could it be resisted by armed force. Federal power is not

136. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d
610 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Tomlin, 454 F.2d 176 (9th Ci. 1972).
137. Warin, 530 F.2d at 106.
138. See, e.g., Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968).
139. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916,922 (st Cir. 1942); see Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34,37 (8th
Cir. 1972). (But as the court indicated in Cases, 131 F.2d at 922, this does not imply protection for the possession
of such weapons as machine guns, mortars, or anti-aircraft guns.)
140. See Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Cases,
131 F.2d at 921 (The only function of the Second Amendment is "to prevent the federal government and the federal
government only from infringing [the] right [of the state to allow people to keep and bear arms].").
141. United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).
142. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 39.
143. See Tot. 131 F.2d 261.
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exercised by guns and armies; it is exercised by taxation and regulation. Any
revolution against such federal actions will be best accomplished by electoral action.
Our republican form of government guarantees the ability of 1the
people to exercise
4
their will and effect change without resort to force and arms.
I. STATES AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
A.

State ConstitutionalRights to Bear Arms
State constitutional provisions often express the right to bear arms more broadly
than does the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. 145 "A guarantee
is placed in a constitution [by its framers] because [they deem it] peculiarly important
and peculiarly exposed to invasion."'" As of 1989, forty-three states guaranteed the
right to bear arms in their respective constitutions. 4 7 Because "[tihe federal Bill of
Rights serves as a floor and not a ceiling,"' 148 state constitutions can offer more rights
149
to individuals, but not less than those guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
Moreover, the Second Amendment to the federal Constitution does not expressly
apply to state and municipal legislation."' According to a recent decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court, which quoted the United States Supreme Court:
[A] state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly
than [the United States Supreme Clourt reads the [fjederal Constitution, or to
reject the mode of analysis used by [the Supreme C]ourt in favor of a different
analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee. 5'
The Ohio Supreme Court, citing the United States Supreme Court, further stated:
[S]tate courts' interpretations of state constitutions are to be accepted as final,
as long as the state court plainly states that its decision is based on independent
and adequate state grounds ....
The recent movement by state courts to rely on their constitutions, rather than
on the federal Constitution, has been labeled "state constitutionalism" or "new
federalism."' 2
Depending on the language of various state constitutional provisions, it is
ambiguous whether the state provisions offer an individual or collective right to bear

144. See Arkansas v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 24 (1843).
145. See generally Ridberg, supra note 32, at 193-200. For example, as of 1989, five state constitutions
contained language to the effect that "people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense." Id. at 196.
Another five state constitutions provided that every citizen may "keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person
or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned." Id. at 199-200.
146. Robert Dowlut, Federaland State Constitutional Guaranteesto Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L REv. 59, 76
(1989).
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 79.
150. See Photos v. City of Toledo, 250 N.E.2d 916, 926 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969).
151. Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 168 (Ohio 1993) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Alladin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)) (first alteration in Arnold).
152. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 168 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)), 169.
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arms. For instance, language such as a "right to bear arms" may lead more to a public
53
right, whereas language such as a "right to keep arms" evidences a private right.1
However, some state constitutions explicitly guarantee a right to arms for selfdefense, unambiguously creating a private right.154 (These states will be hereinafter
called individual right states.)
The collective right view bases the right to bear arms on the right of individual
states to maintain militias. 55 This view is espoused by caselaw, as discussed above,
and by a majority of lawyers and law professors with regard to the federal
Constitution and the Second Amendment.5 6 Collectivists believe that the primary
purpose of the right to bear arms was the maintenance of a strong militia. 57 Thus,
collectivists see the right to bear arms protecting individuals "only insofar as they are
members of the protected group-the state militias."' 5' Conversely, the individualists,
while agreeing that maintenance of a strong militia was one purpose behind the right
to bear arms, argue that its ultimate purpose was either deterrence of governmental
oppression or self defense. 59 Hence, the individualists believe that the right to bear
arms guarantees private possession of weapons to individuals, whether or not the
individuals are part of a militia." °
To determine whether a state constitution provision guarantees an individual or
collective right, two things must be analyzed. First, the stated purpose of the state
right must be examined. "The purpose of a provision might affect the types of
weapons protected and the validity of certain forms of regulation .... ,"161 For
instance, an individual right stems from a right to bear arms for self-defense.' 62
Second, the constitutional language must be examined to determine whether it refers
to those enjoying the right in the plural or singular form, or both. For instance,
Indiana and Oregon's courts have recognized both a private individual constitutional
right and a collective right to bear arms.63

153. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Annrs Under the Tennessee Constitution:A Case
Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REv. 647, 663-64 (1994); see also COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 13
(providing "[tihe right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of
the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be
constned to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons"); CONN. CONST. art. 1. § 15 (stating "[e]very citizen

has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state"); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (stating "[t]he right of the
individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section
shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men");
W. VA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 22 (providing "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family,
home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use").
154. See, e.g., ARm. CONST. art. 2, § 26; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 15; OR. CONST.
art. 1, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22.
155. See Reynolds, supra note 153, at 649.
156. See id. at 649.
157. See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 189-90.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id. (citing Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Oregon v. Kessler, 614 P.2d
94 (Or. 1980)).
161. Id. at 195.
162. See David i. Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DET. C.L.
REv. 789, 793.
163. See id.
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Historically, there have been two primary purposes of state constitutional rights
to bear arms. The first purpose was the maintenance of militias.164 This "purpose no
longer requires widespread possession of weapons, but remains a justification for
arms possession only by militiamen in their official capacity."'' The second purpose
of state constitutional rights to bear arms was self-defense.16 Although at common
law the right to self-defense is a natural right, the right to self-defense did not arise
as a basis for a constitutional right to bear arms until "the incorporation [of the selfdefense right] into several state [constitutional] arms provisions. '"'67 In addition,
"[n]either the police nor the state has a duty to protect the individual citizen. The
burden falls on the citizen to defend himself and his family.' 68 Many state
constitutions specifically guarantee the right to bear arms for self-defense.169 The
historical justification for the recognition of self-defense is the American frontier
experience, during which settlors relied on guns for their survival.170
There are two aspects to self-defense: (1) the right to bear arms to protect the
person and (2) the right to bear arms to protect the home.' 7 ' Although these two
aspects overlap, some state courts have been careful to make a distinction." The selfdefense envisioned by state constitutional framers was generally that of the home,
and of persons while in the home, not the person abroad in society.' The state
framers thought that the social contract174 would protect those abroad
constitutional
175
in society.

The right to self-defense of the home stems from the idea that a man's house is his
"castle.' 7 6 This theory generates the right to possession in one's home of open or
concealed weapons. 77 For instance, the Louisiana state constitution, has been
interpreted as guaranteeing the right to use arms in self-defense in the home against
burglars. 78 The Oregon Supreme Court faced a similar question in Oregon v.
Kessler.'79 In Kessler, the court found that the defendant's possession of a billy club

164. See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 190-91.
165. Id. at191.
166. See id. at 192-93.

167. Id. at 192.
168. Dowlut, supra note 146, at 59-60.
169. See ARz. CONST. art. 2, § 26; COLO. CONST. art. 2,§ 13; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 15; N.D. CONST. art.

1, § 1; OR.
170.
171.
172.

CONST. art. 1, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. 1,§ 24; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22.
See Hunt, supranote 33, at 761 n.48.
See Reynolds, supra note 153, at 666.
See id.

173. See id.
174. The social contract is based on the political philosophy of John Locke and is a compact between a

sovereign and its subjects, whereby the sovereign agrees to protect its subjects and the subjects agree to the
sovereign's governance of them. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT) (Richard H. Cox ed., H. Davidson ed. 1982) (1694);
see also Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology ofSeyf-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87,
90 (1992). But see Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[Tjhere is no constitutional right to be

protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.").
175. See Reynolds, supra note 153, at 666.
176. See Caplan, supra note 162, at 807-08.
177. See Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutionsand the Right to Keep and BearArms,7 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 177, 216 (1982).
178. See Caplan,supra note 162, at 809 (citing McKellar v. Mason, 159 So.2d 700 (La. Ct. App.), affd 162
So.2d 571 (La. 1964)).
179. 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980).
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in his home was protected by the state constitution's right to bear arms provision." °
Although the issue in Kessler primarily revolved around whether a billy club was a
protected "arm" within the meaning of the relevant state constitutional provision, the
Oregon court limited its holding to allowing the possession of a billy club in the
defendant's home.' This case may have had a different outcome had the defendant
brandished a billy club in public.'82
B.

State Regulation of the Right to BearArms
Despite specific state constitutional right to bear arms provisions, states, with some
frequency, also have enacted statutes regulating the right to bear arms. t83 These
regulations come in many shapes, from limiting the uses of weapons to prohibiting
certain individuals from possessing weapons or to prohibiting certain types of
weapons, and from place and manner restrictions to licensing and registration. State
legislatures justify such restrictions through their police power.
1. State Power to Regulate Right
Through their police power, state legislatures may pass laws for the benefit of the
health, safety, and welfare of their state's citizens.' Although state police power is
85
an element of state sovereignty, and the state may enact laws to execute this power,
86
state police power cannot violate a positive mandate of that state's constitution.
Enacting police power-based laws requires balancing the individual's constitutional
right with public safety, and an evaluation of the public benefit to be derived from
the proposed regulation. 87 For state gun control laws, this generally boils down to
balancing the individual right to self-defense against society's right to insure order
through laws.' 88 The resulting "question then [is] which party should [acquiesce to]
the [infringement of its] right."' 89
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in Nebraska v. Comeau,'" faced the issue of
whether Nebraska's right to bear arms constitutional amendment prevented the
Nebraska Legislature from regulating firearms possession.' 9 ' The Comeau court
concluded that a reasonable regulation of the possession of arms was not prohibited
by the state's constitutional amendment. 92 The court stated:

180. See id. at 100.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3204 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.25 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
Ch. 269, § 10 (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-1 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2 (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.41.050 (West 1996).
184. See Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Conn. 1995).
185. See Nebraska v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb. 1989).
186. See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 177, at 185.
187. See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 202-03.
188. See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 177, at 213.
189. Id.
190. 448 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989).
191. See id. at 596.
192. See id. at 600.
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Courts throughout the country have recognized that the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms is not absolute, and these courts have uniformly upheld the
police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory
control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the
safety and welfare of its citizens.' 93

In West Virginiav. Buckner,194 the West Virginia Supreme Court decided the issue
of whether the state legislature could regulate the private possession of arms in West
Virginia.195 The Buckner court noted that the right to bear arms contained within the
West Virginia Constitution was not absolute and that the state's legislature may
regulate the exercise of the right, provided the regulations or restrictions do not
frustrate the guarantees of the West Virginia constitutional provision. 96
2.

Types of State Regulations

a. Licensing, Registration, and Waiting Periods
There are three general types of state regulations-licensing, registration, and
waiting periods. These types of regulations are often used in conjunction with other,
more specific, regulations, such as regulation of who can register or procure a license
or of the type of weapon which must be registered.
Some states require licensing for owners of guns." 9 Licensing is a supportive
measure to insure that firearms do not fall into the hands of those not entitled to
possess them. 9 There are generally two types of licensing that states may employ:
(1) restrictive licensing and (2) permissive licensing. With restrictive licensing, the
grant of a license is completely discretionary--"the applicant has no right to have a
firearm or to receive a permit even if all statutory requirements are met."' 99 Individual
right states, such as Alabama, Maine, and Nevada, all employ restrictive licensing.2m
No individual right state employs restrictive licensing as a prerequisite to purchasing
a standard, i.e., nonexotic and nonultrahazardous, firearm. 20 ' The second type of
licensing is permissive licensing. Permissive licensing requires agencies to grant the
applicant a license, "unless he falls into expressly prohibited categories such as felons
or minors."'
Permissive licensing is used by such individual right states as
Connecticut and Washington. 2 3
The second type of general regulation, registration systems, are often required in
individual rights states.2D Registration systems record the weapon's purchase date
193. Id. at 597.
194. 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).
195. See id. at 140.

196. See id. at 144.
197. See, e.g., supra note 183.
198. See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 209.
199. Hunt, supra note 33, at 773.
200. See id. at 773 n.139 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-73 to 13A-1 1-75 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2031 (Supp. 1984-1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.350-202.400 (1983)).
201. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 773.
202. Id.
203. See id. (citing CONN.GENJ.
STAT. § 29-33 (1985); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.41.070 -9.41.090 (1977)).
204. See id.
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and information that identifies the purchaser.m Without registration requirements,
it would be impossible to prevent felons, drug addicts, or mental incompetents from
purchasing weapons.'
Another similar regulation that some states employ is a waiting period before
obtaining a firearm. Waiting periods allow investigative agencies time to determine
whether the person seeking to buy the weapon is a member of a category of persons
prohibited from obtaining weapons, such as felons or incompetents.' Waiting
periods also prevent the procurement of weapons during times of emotional crisis,
allowing a cooling-off period.2'
Despite state constitutional arms guarantees, licensing, registration, and waiting
period requirements are likely valid exercises of state police powerS-the public
safety benefit of keeping weapons out of unsafe hands outweighs any infringement
on the individual right to keep such weapons;210 and the "historical need" to bear
arms no longer exists.2 ' In Mosher v. City of Dayton2 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that an ordinance which required individuals having or acquiring handguns to
possess an identification card issued by the City of Dayton did not violate the Ohio
Constitution. 13 The Mosher court reasoned that neither the right to bear arms
provision of the federal
or Ohio Constitution preempts the police power authority of
214
the municipality.
In Photos v. City of Toledo,215 the Ohio Court of Appeals examined a challenge
to a city ordinance which required each person purchasing, possessing, or having on
his person a gun to have a handgun owner's identification card.2" 6 The ordinance
denied the right to obtain such a card to certain felons and to certain persons where
there was evidence of incapacity due to age, mental condition, or addiction to drugs
or alcohol. 217 The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violated the right to bear arms
provision of the Ohio Constitution. 2 ' The Photos court found that the ordinance was
a valid exercise of the police power granted to municipalities under the home rule
provisions of the Ohio Constitution219 and that the ordinance had a substantial
relation to the protection of public safety, and, thus, was constitutional. 2"

205. See id.
206. See id. at 775.
207. See Ridberg, supranote 32, at 210.
208. See id.

209. See Hunt, supra note,33, at 774.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. 358 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1976).
213. See id. at 542.
214. See id. at 543.
215. 250 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969).
216. See id. at 917, 918-19, 923-24.
217. See id. at 919, 926, 927.
218. See id. at 924,925-26.
219. See id. at 925.
220. See id. The Photoscourt also determined that the power to prohibit carrying of concealed weapons does
not violate Ohio's constitutional provisions regarding the right to bear arms. See id. The court noted that:
Already more than 12,578 persons have been issued the necessary identification cards permitting
them to purchase guns in Toledo. Approximately 30 applications have been rejected. The
propriety of these rejections has not been challenged herein. Some 1,490 applications are approved
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b. Regulation of Certain Individuals
Framers of the state constitutions were aware that not all individuals are
guaranteed the right to bear arms.2 1 Individuals prohibited from bearing arms include
those who fall into high-risk categories such as "[f]elons . . . idiots, and
lunatics ....222 As one commentator has stated: "[T]he great weight of authority
reflects the belief that the danger created by weapons in the hands of these persons
outweighs the benefit of allowing them to defend themselves or others. 223 For
instance, Utah prohibits gun possession by felons, drug addicts, mental incompetents,
those dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, illegal aliens, and United
States citizens who have renounced such citizenship. 2 Certainly these restrictions
impede the self-defense capabilities of those in a prohibited class. "But [because]
individuals [who are felons or incompetents] are considered more likely to misuse
weapons than to use them successfully in self-defense, these regulations seem
permissible. '2 26
In Colorado v. Blue,2 7 the Colorado Supreme Court examined whether felons
should be able to carry weapons. A Colorado statute prohibited possession of guns
by persons convicted of a felony. 228 The Blue court held that the statute was not
invalid under Colorado's constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear
arms. 229 The court reasoned that because the arms provision of the Colorado
Constitution had limiting language concerning the defense of home, person, and
property the statute fit within the legitimate exercise of police power.uo "'To limit the
possession of firearms by those who, by their past conduct, have demonstrated an
unfitness to be entrusted with such dangerous instrumentalities, is clearly in the
interest of the public health, safety, and welfare' ....,231
Similarly, in North Dakota v. Ricehill, 2 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a statute prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons did not violate
the state constitutional guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms.233 The Ricehill
court stated that "[i]t is patently reasonable for the legislature to conclude that it is
and await issuance. No law abiding citizen, free from the city's disqualifications, has been or will
be precluded from purchasing, keeping or bearing arms.
Id. at 927.
221. See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 177, at 191.
222. Id.
223. Hunt, supra note 33, at 765.
224. See UTAH CODE ArN. § 76-10-503 (1995 Repl.); see also Hunt, supra note 33, at 765.
225. See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 205.
226. Id.; see also Nebraska v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Neb. 1989). The Comeau court explained:
If the use of arms is subject to regulation, then regulation of the right to possession may be the
only practical way to make an effectual regulation of the use. For example, if the use of arms by
persons of unsound mind is to be prohibited, probably the only effectual way to prevent their use
is to prohibit the possession of arms by such persons.
Id.
227. 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 391.
230. See id.
231. Id. (quoting People v. Trujillo, 497 P.2d I (Colo. 1972)).
232. 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987).

233. See id. at 484.
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protecting the public welfare by enacting legislation that keeps firearms out of the
hands of people who have shown a disposition to harm others." 2
A Colorado statute which penalized carrying specified concealed weapons by
those who had committed any of eleven specified crimes was challenged in Colorado
v. Trujillo."5 The defendant challenged the law, arguing that the statute, by
prohibiting certain felons, but not all felons, from carrying specified concealed
weapons, was unreasonable and arbitrary.236 The Trujillo court noted that for the
statute not to violate the equal protection clause, it "'must be based on substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the persons dealt with and the public
purpose to be achieved."' 237 The court found that the classification at issue was
reasonable in relation to the evil sought to be cured"8 and that it was within the state
legislature's police power to protect the public from allowing certain felons to
possess firearms. 39
c. Unprotected Weapons
Currently, there is a dispute in state courts, in interpreting their own state
constitutions, as to what constitutes "arms" with respect to the right to bear arms. The
historical view has interpreted "arms" to mean arms suitable for militias.' Today
this often means the "'modem day equivalents of the weapons used by colonial
militiamen . ..even if a particular weapon is unlikely to be used as a militia
weapon."'' Another interpretation equates arms with weapons "'commonly
possessed by individuals."' 2 This means the weapons protected by state
constitutions are "those within the people's means, those historically used for such
modem equivalents, or those in ordinary use and effective as
purposes and their
2 3
weapons of war." 4
Yet another definition of protected types of arms is arms that are "commonly kept
according to the customs of the people, and [those] appropriate for open and manly
use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense of the State."'2
Thus, semi-automatic weapons could be constitutionally protected as "hand-carried
defensive arms" while modem "arms of mass destruction" are likely unprotected2U
Therefore, state guarantees apply to weapons used in "civilized warfare and not those
used by the ruffian, brawler, or assassin." 2' The Tennessee Constitution takes a
reasonable approach in defining "arms," respecting both individual rights and the
social contract.2" Tennessee's citizens are permitted: to possess arms that are

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 483.
497 P.2d I (Colo. 1972).
See id. at 2.
Id. (quoting Lee v. People, 460 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1969)).
See id.
See id. at 2-3.
See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 177, at 195.
Id. (quoting Oregon v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Or. 1980)).
Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 177, at 195 (quoting Kessler, 614 P.2d at 98-99).
Id. at 195-96.
Caplan, supranote 162, at 810 (quoting Texas v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1875) (emphasis omitted)).
See Dowlut, supra note 146, at 80.
Hunt, supra note 33, at 766 (citing Pierce v. Oklahoma, 275 P. 393, 395 (Okla. 1929)).
See Reynolds, supra note 153, at 666-67.
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"suitable for the defense of home and liberty, to practice shooting, to transport arms
for repairs, to purchase ammunition, and to do everything needful to the exercise of
the citizen's rights."' 8
Because the right to keep arms is not absolute, states, in the exercise of their police
power, may prohibit the ownership and use of some weapons. While courts have
specifically stated that a state legislature, through its police power, can enact
restrictions on the right to bear arms, courts have looked to several factors when
determining whether an arms regulation statute encroaches on a particular right to
bear arms. 24 For instance, when determining a vindication of the right, courts have
evaluated the characteristics and nature of the weapons regulated, the weapons'
typical use, and the number of the particular weapons available.' Weapons which
historically have been prohibited are those which are "unrelated to maintaining a
militia."'" These prohibitions usually boil down to those weapons which are too
exotic or are unusually dangerous to the community.2 2
Banned exotic and ultradangerous weapons are often defined as weapons which
"'will naturally cause a terror to the people.' ' 253 "[S]tatutes outlawing exotic
weapons . . . apparently bar all types of firearms except long guns (rifles and
shotguns) and hand guns, both of which seem to have developed enough
acceptability to take them outside the exotic weapons rubric." 254 Courts also
have
25
decided that some arms are simply too dangerous for individuals to keep.
Assault weapons are a type of weapon that courts have found to be so dangerous
that banning their private ownership does not infringe on constitutional rights. For
instance, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Benjamin v. Bailey,2 6 decided the issue
of whether statutes banning the sale, transfer, or possession of assault weapons
violated the right to bear arms guaranteed by an article of the state constitution."
The Benjamin court held the ban on assault weapons constitutionally permissible. 2 8
The court found the relevant constitutional provision to have limiting language in that
the provision plainly indicated that "the bearing of arms for any purpose other than
defense of one's self or the state" was not afforded constitutional protection. 9 The
court thus interpreted the state constitutional arms provision's limiting language to
mean that the constitutional provision "permits reasonable regulation of the right to
bear arms." The court interpreted the state constitution as protecting each citizen's
right to "possess a weapon of reasonably sufficient firepower to be effective for self248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1234 (Conn. 1995).
See id.
Hunt, supra note 33, at 766.
See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 205.

253. Caplan, supra note 162, at 805 (citations omitted) (quoting 3 FRANCIS WHEATON, A TREATISE ON

CRIMiNAL LAW 2061-62 (1 1th ed. 1912) (paraphrasing the eighteenth century English Serjeant-at-Law, William
Hawkins, on the English 1328 Statute of Northampton in WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE

CROWN 136 (5th ed. London 1771))).
254. Ridberg, supranote 32, at 205.
255. See Caplan, supra note 162, at 810; see also Michigan v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931).
256. 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995).
257. See id. at 1228.
258. See id. at 1235.
259. Id. at 1231 (citing CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 15).
260. Id.
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defense., 261 The court concluded that as long as citizens had at their disposal some
type of weapon reasonable and adequate to "vindicate the right to bear arms in selfdefense,"' 2 the state may prohibit other weapons without violating the constitutional
provision.26 3 To buttress its decision, the court noted that assault weapons increase
risks to society.' "Such weapons are used in criminal activity against police officers
and innocent victims. ' 265 Therefore, the court found the legislature acted with a
legitimate purpose pursuant to its police power.2s
The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided a similar issue in Arnold v. City of
Cleveland.267 In Arnold, the court determined the constitutionality of an ordinance
which banned the possession and sale of "assault weapons" in the City of
Cleveland.' The Arnold court found that although the Ohio Constitution guaranteed
a fundamental right to bear arms, that right was by no means absolute.269 The court
stated:
The right of defense of self, property, and family is a fundamental part of our
concept of ordered liberty. To deprive our citizens of the right to possess any
firearm would thwart the right that was so thoughtfully granted by our forefathers
and the drafters of our [state] Constitution.270
As in Benjamin, the Arnold court related the city ordinance back to the state's
police power.27 In fact, the court noted that "[1]egislative concern for public safety
is not only a proper police power objective-it is a mandate. '272 Assault weapons,
again, were seen as too great a threat to the state's citizens.273
The Council finds and declares that the proliferation and use of assault weapons
[are] resulting in an ever-increasing wave of violence in the form of uncontrolled
shootings in the City, especially because of an increase in drug trafficking and
drug related crimes, and pos[e] a serious threat to the health, safety, welfare, and
security of the citizens of Cleveland. 274
Because the Cleveland City Council banned only those weapons found to be a threat
to community safety, the Arnold court found that the city ordinance fell within the
municipality's police power, and, thus, was not offensive to the Ohio State Constitution. 275
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1235.
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
268. See id. at 166.
269. See id. at 171.
270. Id. at 169-70 (emphasis added).
271. See id. at 171.
272. Id. at 172.
273. "[Ihe function of [assault weapons] is such that any use as a recreational weapon is far outweighed by
the threat that the weapon will cause injury and death to human beings." Id. at 172.
274. Id. at 171-72 (alterations in Arnold) (quoting CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 415-89, § 628.01
(1989)).
275. See id. at 173. A Nebraska law prohibiting possession of a short shotgun was challenged in Nebraska v.
LaChapelle,451 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 1990). The LaChapelle court was faced with the issue of whether the statute,
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However, courts have found that certain types of weapons are not "exotic" or
"unusually dangerous"-and thus cannot be prohibited. For example, in Oregon v.
Delgado,276 the Oregon Supreme Court found a constitutional right violated by a
statute which prohibited the mere possession and carrying of a switchblade knife.277
During a pat-down search, police officers found a switch-blade knife in the
defendant's back pocket.2 8 The defendant told the officer that he carried the knife
for protection as he feared attack by a jealous rival for his present girlfriend.279 The
state argued "that a switch-blade is not a weapon 'commonly used for personal
defense,"' and thus did not fit into the definition of an "arm" within the meaning of
the Oregon Constitution.? The court was faced then with determining "whether the
drafters [of the Oregon constitution] ... intended the word 'arms' to include the

switch-blade knife as a weapon commonly used by individuals for self-defense."281
After discussing the history of knives, the Delgado court found that "knives have
played an important role in American life both as tools and as weapons.'U 2 The court
was unconvinced by the state's argument that "the switch-blade is so 'substantially
different from its historical antecedent' (the jackknife) that it could not have been
within the contemplation of the constitutional drafters. 2 3 However, the court
stressed that their decision did not give individuals an unfettered right to possess or
use constitutionally protected arms. 284 "This court recognizes the seriousness with
which the legislature views the possession of certain weapons, especially switchblades. The problem here is that [the statute at issue] absolutely proscribes the mere
possession or carrying of such arms. This the constitution does not permit." 5
d. Place and Manner Restrictions
States have imposed other prohibitions on the individual right to bear arms in the
way of place and manner restrictions. These restrictions prohibit, for example,
carrying of concealed weapons, prohibit any carrying of certain weapons, 6 and

which prohibited possession of a machine gun, a short rifle, or a short shotgun, was a reasonable regulation
concerning possession of a fiearm in relation to the Nebraska constitutional right to bear arms provision. See id. at
690. The court found that the legislature might be justified, in the interest of its police power and protecting the
public, in concluding that these weapons "are associated with violent crime and call for strict licensing if not
suppression." Id. at 691 (quoting Massachusetts v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976)). The LaChapelle court
noted that the legislature can prohibit some weapons, if others are left for its citizens to use in defense of person and
property. See id. Because the weapon at issue was often the tool of criminal purposes, the court found the statute to
be a valid exercise of the legislature's police power and not at odds with the Nebraska constitutional right to bear arms.
See id.
276. 692 P.2d 610 (Or. 1984).
277. See id. at 614.
278. Seeid. at611.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 612.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 614. In addition to knives, the use of certain types of guns have been found to be well-rooted enough
to be acceptable. See Ridberg, supra note 32, at 205; see also supranote 254 and accompanying text.
283. Delgado, 692 P.2d at 614.
284. See id.
285. Id.(footnote omitted).
286. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29.35 (West 1990) (forbidding a person from carrying a "pistol or
revolver upon his person" without a permit, unless done so within the person's "dwelling house or place of business");
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West 1994) (prohibiting a person from "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly"
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prohibit carrying weapons on or into certain premises, namely public areas.287
Opponents of these laws argue that these laws frustrate a state constitutional arms
provision's purpose of self-defense "if they deny an individual the right to carry a
weapon when he is most likely to be attacked. ' '2 8 However, two counterarguments
exist: (1) danger resulting from "widespread presence of weapons in public places" 9
and (2) "police protection against attack in [public] places," 29 (i.e., the social
contract theory). "Thus, in view of the benefit to be derived from these laws, place
and manner regulations which do not restrict possession in homes or businesses do
not... subvert unduly the self-defense purpose."2 9' State police power and state
police protection authorize and justify anti-concealment statutes or statutes restricting
the carrying of weapons to one's premises or business. 29
Courts have examined the constitutionality of restrictions on types of weapons a
person may possess, on the manner in which weapons are carried (e.g., concealment
of weapons), and on the types of places in which a weapon may be taken. For
example, in Masters v. Texas,2' the defendant was arrested for carrying two swordlike weapons in his belt.2' He challenged the statute under which he was arrested as
a violation of the Texas constitutional right to bear arms. 29' The court noted that
although there is an individual right to keep and bear arms in the Texas Constitution,
the Texas Constitution likewise "limits that right by implicitly mandating the
Legislature to enact reasonable regulations [to] prevent disorder in our society."296
Based on this, the Masterscourt found the penal statute "constitutional... under the
enumerated power delegated by the people to the Legislature to enact laws regarding
the bearing of arms." 29
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in Dano v. Collins,2' decided the issue of another
place and manner restriction-namely, whether a statute prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons was constitutional. 2 9 Here, the court found that "[t]he right to
bear arms in self-defense is not impaired by requiring individuals to carry weapons
openly. ' ' 3' ° The court further found that "[t]he individual's right to keep and bear
arms and the state's duty, under the police power to make reasonable regulations to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, must be balanced. 30' The Dano

carrying a
V.B.2.c.
287.
288.
289.
290.
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"hand-gun, illegal knife, or... club"); see also Hunt, supra note 33, at 761-62; discussion supra Part
See Hunt, supra note 33, at 762.
Ridberg, supra note 32, at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 177, at 213-14.
653 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
See id. at 945.
See id.
Id. at 946.
Id.
802 P.2d 1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
See id. at 1022.
Id.
Id. at 1024.
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court agreed with the state legislature that the restraint on carrying concealed
weapons was necessary for the common good.3 2
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Wyoming v. McAdams, 3 3 held that a
statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed deadly weapons did not infringe upon
the state constitutional right of citizens to bear arms. 3"" In McAdams, sheriff's
deputies noticed a knife on a woman they had pulled over for a routine traffic stop. 3' 5
She was carrying the knife in a sheath inside the right breast pocket of her jacket.3°
She told the officers that she was a cocktail waitress and carried the weapon for her
protection. °7 She challenged her state charge of carrying a concealed weapon on the
30 8
ground that it violated her constitutional right to bear arms in defense of herself.
The McAdams court agreed with the state that, pursuant to the state's police
power, the state could restrict the time and manner in which weapons are possessed,
without infringing on a constitutional right. 309 The court noted that the right to carry
any arms, concealed or otherwise, is not an absolute right.310 The court reasoned that
enacting law pursuant to the police power is necessary to maintain a "semblance of
order" in society. 31' The court explained:
We are cognizant of the fact that our concealed deadly weapons statute imposes
some limitation on a person's right to bear arms in defense of himself; but, when
balanced against the object of the statute, we do not find the limitation
unreasonable, particularly when we recognize that it is not always necessary, nor
is it always lawful, to use deadly force in one's own defense.312
Finally, in New Mexico v. Dees,31 3 the defendant was convicted of carrying a
firearm into a licensed liquor establishment. On appeal, the defendant argued that
prohibiting him from carrying a firearm into a licensed liquor establishment for his4
3
own defense abridged his right to bear arms under the New Mexico Constitution.
The Dees court looked to the legislative purpose of the statute, which, pursuant to the
state's police power, was "'to protect innocent patrons of businesses held out to the
public as licensed liquor establishments.' 3 5 The court concluded that this place
restriction was a valid exercise of police power and not a violation of the New
Mexico Constitution. 3 6 The court reasoned that:
When the legislature perceives that the carrying of a firearm may present a "clear
and present danger" if mixed with the opportunity for its bearer to succumb to
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See id.
714 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1986).
See id. at 1238.
See id. at 1236.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1236-37.
See id.
See id. at 1237.
See id.
Id. at 1238.
100 N.M. 252, 253, 669 P.2d 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1983).
See id.
Id. at 255. 669 P.2d at 264 (quoting New Mexico v. Soto, 95 N.M. 81, 82, 619 P.2d 185, 186 (1980)).
See id.
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the influence of intoxicating liquors, it serves a legitimate goal in a
constitutionally approved manner when it regulates and limits an unfettered
exercise of the citizen's right to bear arms.3" 7

IV. CONCLUSION
To a large extent legislative control over "the right to keep and bear arms" is a
matter of legislative discretion and wisdom. The Second Amendment affords little,
if any, bar, to the regulation or denial of the right to keep and bear arms for personal
use. Furthermore, the Second Amendment only applies to action by the federal
government. State constitutions, by incorporating a right for individuals to bear arms
for personal use, even if a limited right, constrain state regulation of gun possession
and use. However, because of a state's police power and the social contract, a state's
constitutional inability to regulate an individual's right to keep and bear arms is far
from absolute.
While self-defense may be a legitimate purpose for allowing individuals to possess
weapons for personal use, state laws should limit carefully the types of weapons
accessible to individuals. In this way, states may strike a balance between allowing
people the right to defend themselves, others, or property with weapons and creating
terror or instilling a frontier-like mindset amongst their citizens. Safety and freedom
from crime are concerns which, more and more, should emerge at the forefront of our
attempts to better our existence. With the types of "arms" being used to commit
violent crimes becoming more varied, creative, and dangerous, state legislatures
should take care to draft legislation consistent with the intent of the framers of the
federal and state constitutions. Likewise, state legislators protecting sports such as
hunting should tailor legislation to allow for accommodation of technology in
weapons used for hunting while recognizing the windows for abuse created by
loosely drafted legislation. As this Article has shown, throughout English and
American history, governments which intended to allow citizens the right to selfdefense have nonetheless required that weapons conform to a traditional notion of
arms.

Although some may disapprove of a policy allowing only "traditional weapons"
to defend against nontraditional crimes, what kind of civilization do we wish to
encourage? To effectuate the intents of states in including a right to bear arms for
limited purposes within the state constitutions, laws and interpretations of state laws
should reflect state intent to allow a right to have arms for self-defense consistent
with the principles behind the Lockean social contract. It is incumbent on our elected
representatives to carefully weigh the reasons for and against gun control measures
of various kinds, and then to enact legislation that best serves the public interest.

317.

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).

